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Abstract 
Structural change is now widely considered to be an important aspect of national economic 
growth. The issue is not only relevant at the macro-economic level, but also has a direct 
bearing on the growth of regions and cities. In this article, we examine the relationship 
between structural transformation and economic (output) growth across British cities over 
the last half-century. During this time, the British economy has gone through a series of 
extensive structural transformations, most notably a historical shift from an industrial to a 
post-industrial structure. But also within the dominant ‘post-industrial’ economy, some 
service activities have been growing at a faster rate and appear to be more dynamic than 
others. We show how the structural transformations in the national economy have played 
out quite differently across British cities, shaping to a considerable extent their divergent 
growth trajectories over the past five decades. At a broad level, it is possible to distinguish 
between a number of distinct growth groups of cities, and these also display significant 
differences in the extent and direction of structural change and reorientation. While 
differences in structural change have been important in shaping city growth paths, other 
‘city-specific’ factors also appear to have exerted an influence, and thus require 
investigation. Despite the importance of structural change on the growth trajectories of 
British cities, the most comprehensive analysis was undertaken some 30 years ago (see 
Hausner, 1987). This article seeks to fill this lacuna in knowledge. 
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Growing Apart? Structural Transformation and the Uneven 
Development of British Cities 
 
 
Structural Transformation and City Growth 
In the period since the oil crisis of the early 1970s, very considerable changes have taken 
place in the structure of the British economy. Britain has lost much of its industrial base and 
experienced rapid growth in the service sector. While structural change has affected 
virtually every aspect of the British economy, perhaps one of the most significant impacts 
has been on the economic growth of its cities, particularly its large conurbations that owed 
much of their rapid expansion throughout the 18th and 19th centuries to Britain’s 
industrialisation. Many of Britain’s largest cities have struggled to adjust to a post-industrial 
economy. As cities have lost manufacturing jobs, they have experienced periods of high, 
often long-term unemployment, and in more recent years, while there have been more job 
opportunities, these have often been relatively poorly paid, and thus contributed to 
increased levels of income inequality across British society (Fenton et al., 2008). 
 
Despite the importance of structural change on the growth trajectories of cities, it is 
perhaps somewhat surprising that there is relatively little in-depth analysis of the 
phenomenon. In the British case, the most comprehensive analysis to-date appears to have 
been undertaken some 30 years ago (see Hausner, 1987). At that time, an extensive (ESRC-
funded) research project considered how British cities, and their hinterlands, had adapted 
to economic change over the period 1951–1981. More recently, a UK Government Office for 
Science’s Foresight Project on The Future of Cities showed that the growth paths of British 
cities have been quite diverse (Martin et al., 2015), a finding reinforced by other recent 
work (Martin et al., 2016b). Thus, the Foresight Report observed that: 
 
‘‘Economic growth over the past three decades or so has been highly unequal and divergent 
across the UK’s main cities. Many of the former industrial large towns and cities of northern 
Britain have lagged persistently behind those in the south. The weaker performance of many 
of the northern cities has attracted Government attention in the past few years. Improving the 
growth performance in the country’s northern cities is seen as a way to increase jobs and 
incomes for the people living there, but also improve the UK’s productivity’. (Martin et al, 
2015). 
 
How cities deal with structural transformation over time, and the concomitant changes in 
conditions and opportunities for their economic growth, are clearly major issues for society 
and the formulation of policy. Indeed, in Britain, as government devolves economic powers 
from central to local government, it is important that those tasked with managing city 
economies understand the basic mechanisms that lie behind change, and what may be the 
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scope for intervention to assist the process in a way that enhances local economic growth. 
Policymakers need to know more about the sectors that are declining, those that may be 
experiencing successful upgrading or ‘turning around’ and those that are new and growing. 
This knowledge can help them to understand more about how to assist their economies to 
adapt and adjust their structures in response to both the challenges and opportunities of a 
rapidly changing globalised market place. 
 
Cities grow for a variety of reasons (see Storper, 2013). Indeed, a large body of economic 
theory now exists concerned with why economic activity agglomerates in cities, how 
agglomeration influences productivity, human capital formation, wages and innovation, and 
the role played by planning systems (the literature is extensive, but see, for example, 
Cheshire et al., 2014; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Glaeser, 2008; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008; 
Henderson, 2003). These key insights are relevant for understanding city growth. However, 
these literatures have much less to say about the medium- to long-term evolution of city 
economies, about structural transformation and its relationship to diverse city growth 
paths. 
 
Structural transformation refers to the changing sectoral composition of output and 
employment over time, a stylised fact for which there is copious evidence (Cornwall and 
Cornwall, 1994; Freeman and Louca, 2001; Kruger, 2008; Kuznets, 1957, 1973; Metcalfe et 
al., 2006; Pasinetti, 1993). Traditional growth theory always had difficulty incorporating 
structural change, although the notion has found extensive use within the study of 
economic development. But for those economists who reject the distinction between 
development and growth (see Baranzi and Scazzieri, 1990; Kuznets, 1973; Pasinetti, 1981; 
Rodrik, 2016), and for present-day evolutionary economists (such as Metcalfe, 2003; 
Metcalfe et al., 2006), structural change or structural transformation is an integral feature of 
a dynamic modern economy and the study of ‘structural dynamics’ necessary for 
understanding the growth process. As Roncolato and Kucera (2014, 399) put it, ‘sustainable 
economic growth requires structural transformation’. Similarly, in the new evolutionary 
economic geography, particular attention is focused on the path dependence of local 
economic structures, on the process of new path creation—that is, the emergence of new 
industries and technologies—and on the adaptability and resilience of local economies (see 
Bailey and Berkeley, 2014; Boschma and Martin, 2010; Martin and Sunley, 2006, 2015; Pike 
et al., 2010). 
 
It took the path-breaking work of authors such as Kaldor (1966, 1967, 1968), Kuznets (1973) 
and Pasinetti (1981, 1993) to move structural change to centre stage in growth theory. Thus, 
according to Kuznets, 
 
“rapid changes in production structure are inevitable – given the differential impact 
of technological innovations on the several production sectors, the differing income 
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elasticity of domestic demand for various consumer goods, and the changing 
comparative advantage in foreign trade” (1973, p. 250). 
 
Likewise, in Pasinetti’s scheme, structural change is conceived as a multi-sectoral economy 
evolving through time, under the influence of technical progress and changes in final 
demand consumption. Technical change occurs unevenly among sectors, so that the rate of 
change of productivity differs from sector to sector (and, by implication, from region to 
region). Correspondingly, demand changes at different rates among different products. 
Moreover, technical change may take the form of the introduction of new products, and 
hence the emergence of new activities and new sectors. In short, structural dynamics are 
inherent to the growth process. In Kaldor’s seminal works on economic growth theory, 
manufacturing was assigned particular importance as the driver of economic growth 
primarily because it has the greatest potential for dynamic returns to scale (Kaldor, 1978; 
see also Thirlwall, 1983), the implication being that a shift to services could well slow down 
productivity growth. In a later contribution, Baumol et al. (1989) discuss the considerable 
diversity of productivity developments that can be observed across industries and sectors, 
and emphasise the fact that overall productivity growth will on the long run be affected by 
structural change. 
 
Empirically, structural transformation has in recent decades been particularly apparent and 
disruptive through the process of deindustrialisation. ‘Deindustrialisation’ refers to the 
contraction and decline of the weight of manufacturing industry within an economy (Martin 
and Rowthorn, 1986; Pike, 2009). This may only be a relative decline (loss of importance of 
manufacturing as a proportion to other sectors), but there may also be an absolute decline 
(decline in output and employment). In many of the most advanced economies in Western 
Europe and North America, a relative decline of manufacturing began in the 1960s, with the 
service sector growing at a faster rate than manufacturing. But especially after the first oil 
crisis of 1973, the pace of change accelerated, and in many traditional segments of 
manufacturing (such as steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, car manufacturing, chemicals 
etc.), an absolute decline in employment (and in some sectors, also output) set in. This 
coincided with large-scale rationalisation and modernisation operations, with concomitant 
downsizing and plant-closings (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). 
 
The ‘maturity thesis’ regarding deindustrialisation postulates that the relative decline of 
manufacturing is a ‘natural’ consequence of rising incomes and living standards, as 
consumer demand shifts from manufactured goods to services of various kinds (Rowthorn, 
1986; Hudson, 2011). This parallels some of the theoretical insights of Kuznets, Pasinetti and 
Kaldor cited above. In addition, as economies develop, their comparative advantages in 
comparison to other economies will change, so there will be increasing pressures to shift 
into more high-value economic activities that correspond with higher wages and higher skill 
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levels (Pike, 2009; Hudson, 2011). Forms of manufacturing, which mainly rely on cheap and 
semi-skilled labour, will then move to other places where wages, living standards and 
overall levels of education are lower. These factors have meant that—in economically 
advanced nations—the scope for output growth in manufacturing has been smaller than in 
other sections of their economies. Moreover, technological change and productivity 
improvements have meant that employment in industry has fallen drastically, as a 
consequence of ongoing automation and the increasing importance of economies of scale. 
 
Some of these patterns of deindustrialisation seem to be mirrored by recent trends of 
structural transformation within the service sector. Some tradeable parts of the service 
sector—in particular those providing ‘innovation jobs’ (Moretti, 2013), such as IT, life 
sciences, finance, advertising, design, entertainment etc.—exhibit considerable dynamism 
and show continuing growth in employment and output. Other segments of the service 
sector, such as personal services, leisure activities, health care and education, have been 
more stagnant in terms of the application of new technologies; while experiencing 
substantial employment growth, they have shown much slower productivity advance 
(Berger and Frey, 2016; LSE Growth Commission, 2017). How far new advances in 
digitalisation, robotics and machine learning will threaten jobs in these activities is an 
increasingly pertinent issue (Baldwin, 2016; Berger and Frey, 2016). But some recent 
accounts have argued that mature economies such as the UK are experiencing a dominant 
shift of employment to low-productivity, non-tradeable services, and that this can be 
described as ‘growth-reducing structural change’, as it will weaken future innovation and 
productivity growth (Rodrik, 2016). The balance between different types of service industry 
growth is clearly crucial. 
 
These structural transformations have affected different cities and regions differently across 
Europe and North America. Certain places in which manufacturing formed the backbone of 
their economy were badly affected by deindustrialisation, and have undergone serious falls 
in industrial employment. After the initial shock in the 1970s and 1980s, some of these 
places managed to find renewed growth in advanced manufacturing and service industries, 
but recovery has been uneven (Birch et al., 2010; Cowell, 2015; Hobor, 2013; Power et al., 
2010). In part, the success with which cities have re-orientated their economies has 
depended on policies adopted during and after deindustrialisation, and the institutional 
structures within which cities and regions operate (especially with regard to the powers and 
resources available at the subnational level). Indeed, particular macro-economic policies—
such as measures to protect the value of the currency and a lack of an industrial strategy—
together with weak regional policies and an economic governance structure which is 
exceptionally centralised, have undoubtedly contributed to the particular intensity and high 
degree of disruption of deindustrialisation in the UK (Birch et al., 2010; Martin, 1986; 
McCann, 2016; Pike, 2009). But many other factors also appear important in coping 
effectively with structural transformations, such as location, human capital formation, the 
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knowledge and innovation base, agglomeration effects, infrastructure connections, 
entrepreneurial culture etc. These determine whether an urban economy manages to 
develop new activities that incorporate important and dynamic functions (that is, especially 
‘innovation jobs’) in national and international value chains, reducing its dependence on 
‘branch plants’, public sector expenditure and low-productivity services (Baldwin, 2016; 
Massey, 1995; Moretti, 2013; Storper et al., 2015). Such activities will then also contribute 
to its tradeable base and generate additional income within the economy of the city, driving 
employment and output in other activities through multiplier effects (Moretti, 2013; Martin 
et al., 2016b; Rowthorn, 2010). A growing body of work in economic geography has 
examined how industries emerge from related and antecedent sectors. It has been argued 
that those cities that possess a platform of technologically related industries are better able 
to diversify and adapt their economies by spawning more new sectors and industries 
(Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Neffke et al., 2011). However, many of the claims about the 
ways in which the diversification and branching of industrial structures shape long-term 
urban growth have not been tested empirically. 
 
In this article, we examine how differences among cities in medium- to long-run growth, and 
shifts in the growth paths of cities relative to one another, are in part due to differences in 
the process, nature and extent of structural transformation.1 We have taken industrial 
sectors as the unit of our analysis (rather than, say, types of firms) and have considered 
structural transformation in Britain, as it relates to a process in which some sectors expand 
relatively quickly and thus increase their relative share of national output, while others do 
the opposite. 
 
 
City Growth Evolutions 
The growth path of a given city is the outcome of a complex and evolving interaction of 
‘external’ (national and indeed global) factors and city-specific factors and conditions. 
Following Metcalfe et al. (2006), we can think of a city’s economy as being an ‘ensemble’ of 
activities—a structural ensemble—that is constantly changing as a result of this interaction. 
Such a structural ensemble can be examined and decomposed in different ways, of course. 
Our analysis has taken industrial sectors as the primary units of a city’s structural ensemble. 
However, it is entirely plausible to distinguish other constituent elements, like types (or 
sizes) of firms or occupational composition. Ultimately, structural change will involve several 
such dimensions: for example, the decline of manufacturing jobs is almost certain to lead to 
the decline or even disappearance of certain types of occupation. Nevertheless, given our 
                                                          
 
1 Interestingly, in explaining the stimulus for his new theory, Pasinetti attributed it in part to ‘the extremely 
uneven development—from sector to sector, from region to region—of the environment in which I lived (post-
war Europe) at the time I began my training in economics’ (Pasinetti, 1981, xi). 
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interest is in the ‘great transformation’ from an industrial to a post-industrial economy, we 
focus attention here on sectors. 2 The differential growth of a city’s firms and industrial 
sectors imparts structural transformation, while the aggregate pattern of that 
transformation will shape a city’s growth path, relative to other cities. An ensemble 
approach suggests that the development of industries in a particular city may be strongly or 
weakly interrelated (for example through demand linkages, skills and knowledge spillovers) 
so that the performance of an industry in a particular urban area may depend on how it is 
set within and interacts with a wider group of local industries. 
 
What is to be analysed and explained are the differential growth rates of output, 
employment and productivity across the sectoral ensemble of a city. Without differential 
growth, there is no structural change, no evolution of the sectoral shares of city output, 
employment or productivity. If the growth rate of output in sector i in city j is denoted by gij, 
the growth rate of aggregate output in the city by gj, and the growth rate of the share of 
sector i in the total output of the city by 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑔
, then by definition 
 
 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑔 = 𝑔𝑖𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗 
 
and similarly for employment  
 
𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑒 = 𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗 
 
Obviously, if all growth rates, 𝑔𝑖𝑗 (or 𝑒𝑖𝑗),  are equal, the case of proportional growth, the 
output (employment) structure of a city is frozen, and there is no structural change or 
transformation. Further, 
 
 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑒 +  𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑔 + 𝑞𝑗 
 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑗  and 𝑞𝑗 are the growth rates of productivity in sector i in city j and total city 
productivity respectively. Consequently, in an industry in which productivity increases at the 
city average rate, the output share of that sector will change at the same rate as its 
employment share. Hence, proportionate growth implies that all sectors in a city have a 
common rate of productivity growth, which is unlikely to be the case. The key point is that 
the differential growth rates of the sectors making up a city’s industrial ensemble, and what 
                                                          
 
2 We also have constructed time series on the occupational structures of our 85 cities, from 1971 to 2014. The 
analysis of this aspect of city growth and change will form the basis of another paper. 
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makes those growth rates differ, are of central importance in shaping that city’s aggregate 
growth path over time and in relation to that of other cities. 
 
 
Constructing a New Cities Dataset  
A major constraint on examining the way on which British cities have grown and the 
contribution of economic structure is the lack of good-quality sectorally disaggregated time 
series data on output (gross value added [GVA]) and employment. Since 1971, there have 
been a number of changes in the way in which industrial sectors are classified. Moreover, 
there have been changes in geographical boundaries that also complicate analysis. The 
starting point in the analysis was to produce a newly constructed data set with data on GVA 
and employment (and by implication: productivity), with sectoral breakdown (82 sectors) 
for 85 cities in Great Britain for a standardised set of all travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) in 
Great Britain with a population of 200,000 or greater for each year from 1971 to 2014. 
Supplementary Annex 1 provides details of the methodology adopted to construct the data. 
 
In order to examine the patterns of change across British cities, we focus on cumulative 
differential growth, whereby, starting in our base year 1971, we subtract from each city’s 
growth rate in each year the corresponding national (Great Britain) rate and cumulate these 
differences over time (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992, for the development of this approach). 
The overall performance of the 85 cities, measured in terms of their cumulative differential 
growth in output and employment over 1971–2014, is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Output growth and employment growth over 1971–2014 in terms of 
cumulative percentage point deviation from national growth, for 85 British 
cities (including line of best fit and R²).  
 
Note: Southern cities defined as those in the following regions: London, South East, East of England, South 
West and East Midlands. Northern cities defined as those in the West Midlands, Yorkshire-Humberside, North 
West, North East, Scotland and Wales. 
 
 
A number of features emerge. It is clear that the differential growth of both output and 
employment across cities has been substantial. Furthermore, the patterns for output and 
employment are closely correlated: those cities that have experienced the fastest rates of 
growth of employment also tend to be those that have recorded the fastest rate of growth 
of employment and vice versa. Some cities, such as Milton Keynes, Northampton, Telford, 
Crawley and Swindon, have experienced average growth rates in their GVA and employment 
far exceeding the national average (and totalling to a cumulative differential of over 30–40% 
over the period). Other cities, such as Liverpool, Glasgow, Newcastle, Birmingham and 
Sheffield, have grown well below the national rate in both output and employment. Still 
other cities have tracked national growth. Notwithstanding the high correlation between 
output and employment growth, however, some cities show a much slower performance in 
employment than in output, such as Sunderland, Middlesbrough, Manchester and 
Huddersfield. Still other cities seem to experience much stronger employment growth 
compared to GVA growth, such as Colchester, Chelmsford, Plymouth and Southend. 
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Another feature is that many of the fastest growing cities have been in the southern half of 
Britain (roughly south of a line between the Severn and Humber) and most of the slowest 
growing cites have been in the north. Notable exceptions to the latter group are Aberdeen 
(which has benefited from the North Sea oil industry), Telford (a New Town in Shropshire), 
Leamington Spa and Crewe. It is perhaps not inappropriate to refer to the pattern evident in 
Figure 1 as closely corresponding to the conventional depiction of Britain’s economic 
geography as mapping out a broad North-South divide (Lewis and Townsend, 1989; Martin, 
1989; Martin et al., 2016a; Rowthorn, 2010). 
 
We began our more detailed statistical analysis by excluding Aberdeen from our analysis 
because it had uniquely experienced a quite dramatic increase in its growth due to the 
impact of North Sea oil. We also separated out London because of its size and dominance as 
the UK’s capital city. Our research interest was to categorise cities according to their relative 
growth performance over the study period. For our remaining 83 cities, we used the 
Blanchard and Katz differential growth rates to identify three distinctive groups; those cities 
that had grown faster than the nation, which we termed cities ‘pulling away’ (Group I); 
those cities that had grown slower than the national benchmark, which we termed ‘falling 
behind’ (Group III); and those cities that had ‘kept pace’ with the growth of the nation 
(Group II). 
 
Clearly, it was necessary to assess how robust the results of the ensuing analysis in this 
paper, were with respect to the grouping of cities. To test this, we undertook an extensive 
body of sensitivity analysis, which involved subjecting the categorisation to various 
distances (or standard deviations) from the mean growth for the nation as a whole. This 
sensitivity testing showed that using four alternative ‘distances’ from the mean the results 
remained robust. Table 1 shows which cities are in which group. The sensitivity analysis is 
presented in Supplementary Annex 2.  
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Table 1: Groups of British cities defined according to their relative GVA growth 
trajectory using half a standard deviation (unweighted) to distinguish above 
average and below average. 
Group I 
 
(27 cities) 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Peterborough, Chichester, Tunbridge Wells, 
Mansfield, Reading, Guildford, High Wycombe & Aylesbury, Derby, 
Crewe, Norwich, Chesterfield, Bournemouth, Exeter, Cambridge, Slough 
& Heathrow, Lincoln, York, Southampton, Eastbourne, Ipswich 
Group II 
 
(33 cities) 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Trowbridge, Dunfermline & Kirkcaldy, Wakefield, Shrewsbury, Halifax, 
Blyth & Ashington, Colchester, Kettering & Wellingborough, Oxford, 
Stevenage, Gloucester, Doncaster, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, 
Chelmsford, Falkirk & Stirling, Luton, Leicester, Worcester & 
Kidderminster, Chester, Southend, Sunderland, Barnsley, Warrington & 
Wigan, Huddersfield, Brighton, Edinburgh, Bedford, Preston, Durham & 
Bishop Auckland, Bradford, Manchester 
Group III 
 
(23 cities) 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Portsmouth, Coventry, Cardiff, Hull, Newport, Medway, Merthyr Tydfil, 
Motherwell & Airdrie, Middlesbrough & Stockton, Sheffield, Blackburn, 
Plymouth, Newcastle, Birmingham, Dudley, Birkenhead, Blackpool, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, Swansea, Glasgow, Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities in our analysis. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the growth of GVA relative to the nation for the groups from 
1971 until 2014. The relatively fast-growing Group I cities had an average growth rate of 
2.76%, but some cities within the group did better than that, achieving almost 4.5%. The 
overall average growth of Group I cities exceeded that of London by a significant margin, as 
well as that of the non-urban TTWAs. The group grew over a third faster than the Group II 
that tracked the national rate. Group II had relatively little dispersion within it. Group III 
grew at around half the rate of Group I at 1.42%, and there was wide group dispersion, with 
the weakest performer growing at half the group average. 
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Figure 2.  Development of cumulative differential percentage growth of output relative 
to Great Britain: London; Group I (‘pulling ahead’), Group II (‘keeping pace’) 
and Group III (‘falling behind’); and non-urban TTWAs. 
 
 
 
The cities in Group I have thus been characterised by very strong overall growth in output 
throughout the period of study, though this seems to have levelled off somewhat in the last 
15 years of the period under investigation. This group includes Milton Keynes, 
Northampton, Telford, Peterborough, Reading, Cambridge and Southampton. Several of 
these cities were promoted as New Towns and assisted by British spatial policy to become 
centres of growth. The New Town approach was to facilitate a planned approach to 
economic development, whereby a Development Corporation was established with 
extensive powers relating to land assembly and the provision of infrastructure in order to 
promote economic development. The evidence suggests that they may have been quite 
successful in this respect. Group II has tracked the growth of the nation quite closely and 
includes cities like Oxford, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, Leicester and Manchester. Group III 
comprises 23 cities that have more or less consistently grown well below the national rate. 
This group comprises many of the oldest industrial areas and includes Cardiff, 
Middlesbrough, Sheffield, Newcastle, Birmingham, Swansea, Glasgow and Liverpool. 
 
London shows a particularly interesting growth trajectory throughout the study period. 
After a period of relative decline up until the mid-1980s, it then ‘turned-around’ and has 
grown faster than the national average since. It is also of interest to note that the TTWA 
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residual group has tended to grow slightly above the national average over the study period, 
in line with the relatively better performance of near accessible areas around the cities in 
the post-war period, as documented by Keeble and Tyler (1995). 
 
 
Structural Transformation in the British Economy  
As already noted earlier, the UK was the first major industrial nation to experience a strong 
relative decline in the growth of its manufacturing sector; a process that began in the mid-
1960s, some time before the same process affected other nations (Rhodes, 1986). It has also 
been the case that the UK has experienced the greatest relative employment decline in 
manufacturing, compared to all its major competitors (Townsend, 1983). Figure 3 shows the 
broad pattern of output change in Britain over the period for larger aggregations of the 82 
sectors (see Annex 1). The differential growth performance across sectors reveals the scale 
of the change in the last five decades. As Table 2 shows, over the period overall output in 
the national economy has grown by around 150% since 1971. As outlined in the section 
above, sectors that have grown below the national average growth rate will have seen their 
share in national output decrease, while sectors that have grown at a faster pace will have 
expanded their share. Growth of output in manufacturing sectors, including high-tech, has 
been far below the average, and hence their share has fallen: in some cases (especially in 
metals and textiles) output has actually declined. The sectors in which output has grown 
considerably faster than the British average—and hence now represent a larger share of 
output—have been oil and gas extraction, retail and personal services and especially 
knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS). 
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Figure 3: Sectoral growth across the British economy 1971-2014. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sectoral change across the British economy over 1971-2014. 
 Indexed change in GVA in 2014 
(base 1971=100) 
Indexed change of broad sector group 
relative to growth of GB 
Agriculture and fishing 158.6 63.6 
Coal and Other mining 76.6 30.7 
Oil, Gas and Mining support 400.9 160.7 
Metals and related 75.0 30.1 
Textiles and related 34.2 13.7 
Light manufacturing 124.8 50.0 
High tech manufacturing 160.1 64.2 
Utilities 226.9 90.9 
Construction 150.8 60.4 
Transport and logistics 236.8 94.9 
Retail and personal services 313.1 125.5 
Knowledge Intensive Business Services 656.0 262.9 
Public services 197.8 79.2 
Total 249.5 100.0 
 
 
The process of deindustrialisation has resulted in manufacturing declining from nearly 22% 
of output in 1971 to just over 10% of output in 2014. But also within services, some sections 
of the service economy (especially the KIBS and to a lesser extent retail and personal 
services) have been growing at a faster rate than other sections. The share of services (both 
private and public) went from about 50% of output in 1971 to 68% in 2014; but within 
services, KIBS increased its share of total service output from about a quarter to nearly half. 
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We can now identify the sectors that have managed to grow above average over the period 
from 1971 to 2014 (and thus have seen an expansion of their share), and those that have 
performed below average (and hence will have decreased their share). Moreover, we can 
further distinguish between sectors according to their labour productivity performance, 
which reflects their dynamism and capability to generate high-value employment. Figure 4 
shows the 82 sectors plotted according to their annual average output growth and growth 
in productivity over the 1971–2014 period. We can distinguish between four performance 
types, which are listed in Table 3. The first group contains those sectors that have had a 
growth of output and productivity below the national average. This includes large sectors 
such as public administration and defence, education and construction. The second group 
has had slow output growth, but above national average productivity growth as a result of 
employment loss. This group includes most of manufacturing. The third group has had faster 
growth of output but slower productivity growth than the national average. This includes 
most personal services, health care and several of the KIBS. The fourth group are those that 
have experienced relatively faster output and also productivity growth, and are thus the 
most impressive performers across the sectoral groups. This group encompasses most of 
the KIBS, retail, pharmaceuticals and oil and gas extraction. 
 
Figure 4:  Sectoral growth in output and productivity in terms of annual compound 
growth rates over 1971–2014 (pecked lines indicate average rates for the 
British economy as a whole). 
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Table 3:  Sectoral change across the British economy. 
Performance type Sectors GVA change Productivity 
change 
Employment 
change 
GVA below average, 
Productivity below 
average 
 Public administration and defence 
 Education 
 Construction 
 Wholesale trade 
 Accommodation and other leisure 
services 
1.07% on 
annual basis 
 
58.2% over 
period 
0.41% on 
annual basis 
 
19.4% over 
period 
0.66% on 
annual basis 
 
32.5% over 
period 
GVA below average, 
Productivity above 
average 
 Most manufacturing 
 Electricity and gas supply 
 Water transport 
 Insurance and pensions 
0.33% on 
annual basis 
 
15.1% over 
period 
2.85% on 
annual basis 
 
235.0% over 
period 
-2.45% on 
annual basis 
 
-65.6% over 
period 
GVA above average, 
Productivity below 
average 
 Most personal services 
 Health care, residential care, and 
social work 
 Some KIBS 
 Warehousing 
 Waste disposal and management 
3.74% on 
annual basis 
 
384.4% over 
period 
1.12% on 
annual basis 
 
61.6% over 
period 
2.59% on 
annual basis 
 
199.7% over 
period 
GVA above average, 
Productivity above 
average 
 Most KIBS (including information 
services, computer programming, 
telecommunications, scientific 
research, and financial services) 
 Retail 
 Pharmaceuticals 
 Oil and gas extraction, and support 
activities 
 Land transport 
 Air transport 
3.69% on 
annual basis 
 
374.5% over 
period 
3.03% on 
annual basis 
 
260.2% over 
period 
0.64% on 
annual basis 
 
31.7% over 
period 
Total for Great 
Britain 
 2.15% on 
annual basis 
 
149.5% over 
period 
1.59% on 
annual basis 
 
98.6% over 
period 
0.55% on 
annual basis 
 
26.8% over 
period 
 
 
Structural Transformation in British cities 
This section is concerned to assess the how the structural transformation discussed in the 
previous section has played out over the various cities in Great Britain. The economic 
growth prospects of cities will be importantly conditioned by the initial presence of certain 
sectors at the beginning of the period and the general development of sectors over the 
period. Hence, we will first look at how economic activities were distributed over the 
country in 1971 and how this has changed over the period until 2014. We will then analyse 
what this has meant for changes in GVA for the cities from 1971 until 2014. 
 
Table 4 shows the economic structure of the groups of cities in 1971. Clearly, manufacturing 
was still a relatively important segment of the economy, with nearly 22% of the output in 
the nation. It is also clear that there was an overrepresentation of manufacturing—which, as 
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highlighted above, has, has grown very little—in Groups II and III, with Group II also 
specialising more in textiles and Group III more in metals and related industries. Private 
services—where a lot of the growth has taken place in the subsequent period—made up 
about 37% of the British economy in 1971. There is not that much disparity between the 
economic structures of the various types of cities and the non-urban TTWAs in this respect. 
Also, private services had a comparable share between the three main groups of cities and 
the non-urban TTWAs. The exception here is London, in which private services formed a 
much greater share (51%), mainly because of a far greater share of KIBS (although transport 
and logistics also had a larger share than in the national economy). Hence, London seemed 
to have been somewhat better placed to benefit from the structural transformations that 
were going to occur in the next decades, whereas Groups II and III were at a comparative 
disadvantage. For the sake of contrast and of completeness, we have included Aberdeen as 
well in this table. 
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Table 4: Economic structure in groups of cities in 1971, with total GVA in 1971 for broad 
groups of sectors and for performance types (GVA figures in million £s, 2011 
Current Market Value). 
 London Group I: 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Group II: 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Group III: 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Non-
urban 
TTWAs 
Aber-
deen 
Great 
Britain 
Total 
GVA 
1971  
Broad sector groups         
Agriculture and 
fishing 
0.2% 1.4% 0.8% 0.7% 2.2% 3.9% 1.0% 5,218 
Coal and Other 
mining 
0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2,074 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 1,430 
Metals and related 
 
2.1% 3.7% 3.5% 7.4% 5.4% 1.2% 4.4% 23,959 
Textiles and related 
 
1.4% 1.3% 4.1% 1.6% 2.3% 0.9% 2.2% 12,029 
Light manufacturing 
 
5.3% 8.5% 8.4% 9.5% 8.5% 16.3% 8.1% 43,733 
High tech 
manufacturing 
4.3% 8.1% 9.2% 10.5% 5.3% 1.7% 7.7% 41,653 
Utilities 
 
1.1% 2.4% 3.0% 2.8% 3.1% 4.7% 2.5% 13,485 
Construction 
 
10.3% 10.5% 10.7% 11.5% 11.7% 13.2% 10.9% 59,022 
Transport and 
logistics 
15.1% 12.4% 10.7% 10.9% 10.7% 12.2% 11.9% 64,362 
Retail and personal 
services 
11.2% 13.8% 13.5% 12.1% 14.7% 11.2% 12.9% 69,463 
Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services 
24.7% 9.1% 8.6% 9.0% 7.6% 8.7% 12.0% 64,529 
Public services 
 
23.9% 28.3% 26.5% 23.6% 27.1% 25.7% 25.7% 138,334 
Performance types         
GVA below average, 
Prod below average. 
44.4% 44.8% 42.6% 41.0% 47.9% 44.7% 43.7% 235,658 
GVA below average, 
Prod above average 
16.5% 23.4% 26.2% 31.2% 23.6% 27.4% 24.6% 132,637 
GVA above average, 
Prod below average 
19.8% 16.2% 15.5% 13.9% 14.0% 12.0% 15.9% 85,590 
GVA above average, 
Prod above average 
19.3% 15.6% 15.7% 13.9% 14.5% 15.8% 15.8% 85,406 
Total GVA 1971 111,959 
(100.0%) 
84,466 
(100.0%) 
133,067 
(100.0%) 
130,019 
(100.0%) 
76,202 
(100.0%) 
3,579 
(100.0%) 
539,291 
(100.0%) 
539,291 
Share of Group in 
1971 
20.8% 15.7% 24.7% 24.1% 14.1% 0.7% 100.0%  
 
 
Figures 5–9 show how the relative distribution of broad types of sectors over the groups 
changed over time, by displaying the development of the location quotients. Agriculture and 
fishing, coal and other mining, and oil and gas extraction are excluded as these made up 
relatively small shares of the British economy and are moreover activities that mainly take 
place outside of cities. 
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Figure 5:  London: location quotients for broad groups of sectors based on GVA-shares. 
 
 
 
London already had relatively low concentrations of manufacturing activity, and this has 
been falling further over the period. The very high concentrations of output in KIBS have 
remained high. But interestingly, the relative share declined somewhat over the 1970s 
before being restored in the 1980s, probably because of the cessation of government policy 
activity designed to disperse office-based activity from London to its surrounding areas. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the relative concentration began to fall somewhat again. 
London has experienced a marked drop in the concentration of output in transport and 
logistics and the public sector throughout the period. 
 
The cities in the fast-growing Group I had somewhat lower concentrations of manufacturing 
initially. But they have increased their relative concentration in high-tech manufacturing 
over the period, particularly after the mid-1990s (Figure 6). These cities have noticeably 
increased their relative concentration in transport and logistics and also KIBS, while their 
share of public service output has gone down. 
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Figure 6:  Group I (‘pulling ahead’): location quotients for broad groups of sectors based 
on GVA-shares. 
 
 
 
The cities in Group II (Figure 7) have historically been characterised by a relatively greater 
concentration of textile-related activity, which—even though this sector has declined very 
significantly at the national level—has remained concentrated in these cities. In terms of 
private services (as well as other types of manufacturing), there seems to be a convergence 
taking place, in which the cities in Group II increasingly emulate the economic structure of 
the nation as a whole. 
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Figure 7: Group II (‘keeping pace’): location quotients for broad groups of sectors based 
on GVA-shares. 
 
 
 
The cities in Group III were historically characterised by a relatively high share of 
manufacturing, in particular of manufacturing in metal-related industries, as is clear from 
Figure 8. This pattern has persisted. As noted, manufacturing output has grown only very 
little over the period; hence, there may be an indication that the comparatively high 
concentrations of manufacturing have contributed to the slow growth of these cities in 
general. The more fast-growing private services remain underrepresented in the cities in 
Group III, and this is especially true for the KIBS. By contrast, public services seem to have 
increased their share in these cities considerably relative to the nation as a whole. This may 
have provided something of a compensating development, but an increasing dependence 
on public services carries its own problems as a basis for sustained high growth over the 
long term. 
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Figure 8: Group III (‘falling behind’): location quotients for broad groups of sectors 
based on GVA-shares. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 makes clear that manufacturing is increasingly concentrated outside of the cities, in 
less urbanised and rural locations. KIBS still seem to have a clear predilection for cities 
however, and the concentration of KIBS in more rural parts of the country has remained 
quite low. 
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Figure 9:  Non-urban TTWAs: location quotients for broad groups of sectors based on 
GVA-shares 
 
 
 
These developments in the geographical distribution of industries over Great Britain are also 
reflected in the sectoral breakdown of changes in output across the various groups over the 
period. Tables 5 and 6 show the breakdown of output change over the period. Table 5 
exhibits which sections of the economy experienced negative output change—that is, a 
decline in output—over the period. At the bottom of the table, the total absolute decline in 
each of the groups is presented, which is broken down into the percentage contribution of 
each broad sector group and again of each sector performance type. Table 6 presents a 
similar breakdown for positive output change—in other words, growth in GVA—and shows 
the primary sources of growth in each of the groups. Added together the negative change in 
Table 5 and positive change in Table 6 will represent the overall (net) GVA growth over the 
period for each group. 
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Table 5: Breakdown of negative GVA change by broad sector groups and performance 
types for groups of cities; 1971-2014 (GVA figures in million £s, 2011 current 
market value). 
 London Group I: 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Group II: 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Group III: 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Non-
urban 
TTWAs 
Aber-
deen 
Great 
Britain 
Total 
neg. GVA 
change  
Broad sector groups         
Agriculture and 
fishing 
0.6%  0.2% 0.3%  22.1% 0.5% -171 
Coal and Other 
mining 
1.4% 1.4% 6.3% 0.9% 7.4%  2.7% -973 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
  7.2% 1.0% 0.5%  1.9% -672 
Metals and related 
 
16.6% 25.5% 11.1% 33.4% 50.9% 6.5% 24.9% -8,860 
Textiles and related 
 
11.3% 27.2% 51.3% 10.5% 35.8% 6.1% 22.2% -7,917 
Light manufacturing 
 
21.1% 20.0% 7.2% 12.7% 2.7% 56.9% 13.9% -4,944 
High tech 
manufacturing 
28.1% 7.6% 7.3% 28.5%   20.1% -7,173 
Utilities 
 
3.4% 18.4% 9.4% 6.9% 2.7%  6.7% -2,395 
Construction 
 
       0 
Transport and 
logistics 
9.2%   5.8%   4.7% -1,659 
Retail and personal 
services 
       0 
Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services 
     8.4% 0.1% -25 
Public services 
 
8.3%      2.3% -822 
Performance types         
GVA below average, 
Prod below average. 
14.5% 18.4% 9.8% 9.1% 41.5% 6.5% 14.0% -4,981 
GVA below average, 
Prod above average 
85.5% 81.6% 82.9% 89.9% 58.0% 82.5% 84.0% -29,914 
GVA above average, 
Prod below average 
  0.2%    0.0% -12 
GVA above average, 
Prod above average 
  7.2% 1.0% 0.5% 11.0% 2.0% -704 
Total negative GVA 
change 
-9,928 
(100.0%) 
-2,169 
(100.0%) 
-7,364 
(100.0%) 
-12,889 
(100.0%) 
-2,963 
(100.0%) 
-298 
(100.0%) 
-35,611 
(100.0%) 
-35,611 
GVA in 1971 
 
111,959 84,466 133,067 130,019 76,202 3,579 539,291  
Negative GVA-change 
as % of GVA in 1971 
-8.9% -2.6% -5.5% -9.9% -3.9% -8.3% -6.6%  
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Table 6:  Breakdown of positive GVA change by broad sector groups and performance 
types for groups of cities; 1971-2014 (GVA figures in million £s, 2011 current 
market value) 
 London Group I: 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Group II: 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Group III: 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Non-
urban 
TTWAs 
Aber-
deen 
Great 
Britain 
Total 
pos. GVA 
change  
Broad sector groups         
Agriculture and 
fishing 
 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 1.2%  0.4% 3,229 
Coal and Other 
mining 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1%   0.3% 0.1% 488 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
0.1% 0.3%   0.1% 32.0% 0.6% 4,975 
Metals and related 
 
 0.3% 0.4%  1.2% 1.3% 0.3% 2,882 
Textiles and related 
 
     0.0% 0.0% 4 
Light manufacturing 
 
0.2% 1.4% 2.2% 0.9% 5.8% 2.4% 1.9% 15,780 
High tech 
manufacturing 
0.3% 5.8% 3.1% 4.8% 6.9% 3.0% 3.8% 32,190 
Utilities 
 
1.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.9% 2.8% 0.9% 2.3% 19,506 
Construction 
 
2.2% 4.7% 4.5% 1.1% 5.1% 2.0% 3.6% 29,984 
Transport and 
logistics 
7.2% 14.5% 11.2% 9.9% 10.4% 8.7% 10.7% 89,726 
Retail and personal 
services 
12.4% 17.5% 19.8% 20.1% 20.6% 15.0% 17.6% 148,014 
Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services 
66.0% 39.1% 37.8% 34.6% 26.3% 25.7% 42.6% 358,813 
Public services 
 
10.0% 13.3% 18.0% 25.4% 19.5% 8.7% 16.2% 136,100 
Performance types         
GVA below average, 
Prod below average. 
13.2% 18.5% 18.5% 15.8% 19.6% 11.3% 16.9% 142,168 
GVA below average, 
Prod above average 
1.4% 7.3% 6.4% 3.5% 13.1% 7.0% 5.9% 49,959 
GVA above average, 
Prod below average 
42.6% 34.7% 39.6% 43.8% 35.9% 26.0% 39.1% 328,999 
GVA above average, 
Prod above average 
42.8% 39.4% 35.5% 37.0% 31.4% 55.7% 38.1% 320,565 
Total positive GVA 
change 
203,378 
(100.0%) 
190,442 
(100.0%) 
192,694 
(100.0%) 
121,695 
(100.0%) 
121,239 
(100.0%) 
12,243 
(100.0%) 
841,691 
(100.0%) 
841,691 
 
GVA in 1971 
 
111,959 84,466 133,067 130,019 76,202 3,579 539,291  
Positive GVA-change 
as % of GVA in 1971 
181.7% 225.5% 144.8% 93.6% 159.1% 342.1% 156.1%  
 
 
With regard to negative output change, it is clear that London and the cities in Group III 
have had to deal with more decline in their sectors than other parts of the country. In both 
cases, this was due to substantial losses of output in manufacturing, which perhaps also had 
a further negative effect on transport and logistics. In London, furthermore, public 
administration and defence have lost output. In Group III, some parts of its metal-related 
industry (in particular, basic steel making and manufacture of metal products) and of its 
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high-tech manufacturing (especially production of motor vehicles and of machinery) have 
sustained heavy losses. In Group II, the dramatic decline of the textile industry in Britain is 
clearly noticeable, but other segments in manufacturing have not suffered as much as in 
Group III and in London. 
 
There have been very large differences in the capacity to generate output growth between 
the groups over the period. On the one hand, there are the well-performing cities in Group I 
and London, which have seen a lot of expansion across their economies. On the other hand, 
there are the poorly performing cities in Group III, which, in addition to experiencing more 
decline in output, have also not been able to generate much output growth compared to 
other cities. Group II and non-urban TTWAs have been tracking the national average in this 
respect. It is also immediately clear from this table that very little growth has come from 
manufacturing, with the exception perhaps of some parts of high-tech manufacturing 
(mainly pharmaceuticals, production of computers and of motor vehicles) in Group I and 
non-urban TTWAs. By far, the greatest share of growth in all the groups has been in private 
services, especially KIBS and to a lesser extent retail and personal services. In London, KIBS 
account for around two thirds of positive change in output. Also, Group I shows a greater 
increase of output because of growth in KIBS than the other groups. The nature of the 
growth of KIBS between London and the cities of Group I is somewhat different though. 
Growth in London is driven more by financial services, legal and accounting, and 
entertainment industries; whereas growth in Group I is dominated more by IT services and 
real estate activities. Group III is lagging behind somewhat in terms of the share of its 
growth due to KIBS. This group by contrast shows a much greater share due to the 
expansion of public services, especially health care and education. These developments 
then also explain the greater share of higher productivity growth activities in the output 
growth of London and Group I, while in Group III, somewhat more of its growth is 
constituted of sectors with lower productivity growth. 
 
 
Contribution of Structural Factors to the Growth of British Cities 
The foregoing analysis would seem to suggest that output growth in cities has been strongly 
influenced by their initial sectoral structure and how that structure then changes over time; 
in other words, economic structure would appear to be a key determinant of city output 
growth. However, the performance of sectors is not uniform throughout the country, and 
thus, the growth of cities may be importantly affected by sectors doing significantly better 
or worse in some cities than would be expected, based on their national performance. The 
expansion or decline of some sectors can thus be concentrated in some cities while 
bypassing others. Hence, a city’s structural ensemble and how that ensemble changes over 
time will only partially explain the growth of cities. Other factors will be important, such as 
differences in levels of innovation and entrepreneurship, as well as the geographical spread 
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of the types of functions within sectors (head offices, R&D, administration, production etc.). 
These differences may in turn reflect local advantages in terms of human capital, 
agglomeration, policy, proximity to London and governance etc. (Martin et al., 2016b). To 
explore the relative contribution of structural versus other, city-specific ‘competitiveness’ 
factors, we use a dynamic shift-share analysis. 
 
Shift share has been used extensively, and there is a large literature discussing its 
application and relative strengths and weaknesses. Prominent among the literature is the 
work of Fothergill and Gudgin (1982), Selting and Loveridge (1992, 1994) and Loveridge and 
Selting (1998). A standard criticism is that the choice of weights used to represent the 
structural base influences the results. In an attempt to overcome this, research has relied on 
dynamic versions that have the advantage over conventional models of allowing both 
growth rates and economic structure to change, rather than being pivoted on a set of 
weights at a particular point in time. Examples of this approach include Barff and Knight 
(1988), and Chern et al. (2002). More recently, attention has been focused on incorporating 
regression analysis into shift share, with examples including Blien et al. (2013). 
 
We adopted the dynamic shift-share decomposition procedure as used in Gardiner et al. 
(2013). This has the advantage of recording and updating the levels of sectoral composition 
and the changes within this on an annual basis, so the point of reference to distinguish 
between structural effects and local city-specific effects is allowed to shift over time. It also 
provides additional information on dynamic transition, which could not be obtained from 
the standard comparative-static shift-share method. The analysis has been conducted at an 
82 sectoral level. 
 
The classic shift-share approach decomposes temporal change in a variable into three 
additive effects: 
(i) National component (NC) the change that would occur if all cities' sectors grow at 
national rate 
(ii) Structure effect (SE) the change that would occur if all cities' sectors grow at 
national sector rate (minus, or conditional on, the 
national share effect) 
(iii) Local effect (LE) the difference between the actual change and the sum of 
national and industry shifts, i.e. a residual designed to 
capture local-specific factors such as competitiveness, 
concentration of higher value functions, local policy, etc. 
 
More formally, if we consider a variable X, defined over industry i, city j and time t, a 
temporal change between time t and t+n can be written as: 
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𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑡 = ∆𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 = 𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 + 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 + 𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 
 
Each of these three components can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑔𝑛 
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∙ (𝑔𝑖𝑛 − 𝑔𝑛) 
𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∙ (𝑔𝑖𝑗 − 𝑔𝑖𝑛) 
 
Where: 
g = the growth of the variable X over the pre-defined time period (between t+n and t); 
gn = the national (percentage) growth of variable X during this period, 
gin = the national (percentage) growth by industry i of variable X during this period; and 
gij = the city (percentage) growth by industry i of variable X during this period. 
 
By summing over all industries in any given city, we arrive at the overall national, industrial 
mix and residual shift components: 
 
𝑁𝐶𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑖
∙ 𝑔𝑛 
𝑆𝐸𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑖
∙ (𝑔𝑖𝑛 − 𝑔𝑛) 
𝐿𝐸𝑗
𝑡+𝑛 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑖
∗ (𝑔𝑖𝑗 − 𝑔𝑖𝑛) 
 
Using the dynamic version of the technique, and thus decomposing city changes in output 
on a year-by-year basis, we were able to investigate the contribution that changes in 
economic structure have made to each city Group’s output growth differential over time. 
This differential growth already incorporates the national component; hence, we focus on 
the contribution of the structure effect and local effect to the positive or negative gap in 
performance compared to national growth. Moreover, in order to see how matters evolve 
over the study period, we can track the relative contributions of the structure effect and 
local effect in the cumulative development of this gap over time. Figure 10 shows the 
results. 
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Figure 10.  The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential 
output growth relative to Great Britain across the city groups, in GVA (GVA 
figures in billion £s, 2011 current market value) based on 82 sectors. 
London 
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The findings in the case of London are clear. Throughout the period, London benefited from 
its particular economic structure; that is to say, London has benefited from having a high 
proportion of nationally fast-growing sectors. However, London has certainly not managed 
to benefit as much as expected, as the structure effect was offset by a negative local effect, 
which held on persistently over many years until the mid-1990s. But in recent years, this 
local effect has become strongly positive, making up for much of the accumulated losses 
with regard to the potential growth of London in the decades before (see Figure 2). 
 
The structural effect also appears substantial in explaining the slow growth of the cities in 
Group III. Throughout the period, these cities have been at a disadvantage because of the 
composition of their economies, and especially until the mid-1980s, this appears to explain 
about half of the negative gap in output growth with the nation as a whole. However, the 
negative impact of the local effect has been at least as large and has only increased over 
time compared to the structural effect. This means that cities in this group have not only 
lagged because they have an unfavourable mix of sectors, but that in general those sectors 
underperform compared to the performance of the sectors for the nation as a whole. This 
suggests that the various factors that influence a city’s overall competitiveness have 
become increasingly unfavourable. 
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Group II and the non-urban TTWAs also had to cope with negative impacts of their industrial 
structure over the period, especially after the early 1980s. But these cities and TTWAs 
managed to compensate for this negative structure effect through a positive local effect for 
most of the period. Hence, the performance of the sectors that are present in these 
locations has on the whole been better than expected. 
 
The strong growth of the Group I cities has almost entirely been due to highly positive local 
effects: the sectors in these cities have strongly outperformed the national average trends 
in those sectors. Only from the mid-1990s onwards does a modest positive structure effect 
emerge, as a result of a higher concentration of high-growth sectors. But the local effect 
clearly dominates and seems to reflect a growing competitive advantage of these cities 
compared to other parts of Great Britain, although this advantage seems to have stabilised 
following the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
 
Implications of Structural Transformation in British Cities for Employment 
The structural transformation goes some way in accounting for the observed patterns of 
output growth across cities; however, a full explanation would need to examine the host of 
factors and processes that are subsumed under the ‘local effect’ identified above. This is 
beyond the scope of this present article, but factors that are relevant here are local supply 
effects that affect the ability of areas to adapt to change, as well as factors that enhance an 
areas competitive advantage like proximity to London and thus market opportunity. 
 
Also of interest are the implications of the patterns of output growth for city employment 
trends. As shown in Figure 1, there is a reasonably close correlation between output growth 
and employment growth across British cities. Tables 7 and 8 explore this relationship further 
and show the breakdown of employment changes in the city groups across broad sector 
groups and across sector performance types. The general picture is very similar to the one 
painted in the section above (in terms of GVA), with the same patterns of growth and 
decline in the various Groups and sectors. But much more than when examining the output, 
the churn between and within different segments of the economy comes into view. From an 
employment perspective, the scale of the process of structural transformation over the past 
five decades is quite remarkable. Even within parts of the economy which exhibit substantial 
growth of output—such as transport and logistics, public services, utilities and, to a much 
lesser extent, KIBS (with some job loss in insurance and pensions)—considerable 
movements take place, which are not visible when looking at changes in GVA alone. 
 
 
 
31 
Table 7: Breakdown of negative employment change, by broad sector groups and 
performance types for groups of cities; 1971-2014. 
 London Group I: 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Group II: 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Group III: 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
Aberdeen Great 
Britain 
Broad sector groups        
Agriculture and 
fishing 
-7,612 
(0.6%) 
-53,847 
(6.5%) 
-82,352 
(4.5%) 
-50,453 
(2.3%) 
-88,113 
(13.5%) 
-9,369 
(23.1%) 
-291,746 
(4.3%) 
Coal and Other 
mining 
-4,443 
(0.4%) 
-20,452 
(2.5%) 
-63,159 
(3.4%) 
-43,264 
(2.0%) 
-56,746 
(8.7%) 
-2 
(0.0%) 
-188,066 
(2.8%) 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
-3,872 
(0.3%) 
-6,366 
(0.8%) 
-31,055 
(1.7%) 
-30,216 
(1.4%) 
-33,415 
(5.1%) 
 -104,924 
(1.5%) 
Metals and related 
 
-86,087 
(6.8%) 
-105,851 
(12.8%) 
-177,467 
(9.6%) 
-492,408 
(22.7%) 
-78,834 
(12.0%) 
-281 
(0.7%) 
-940,928 
(13.8%) 
Textiles and related 
 
-69,172 
(5.5%) 
-76,772 
(9.2%) 
-504,546 
(27.3%) 
-173,599 
(8.0%) 
-138,716 
(21.2%) 
-4,593 
(11.3%) 
-967,398 
(14.2%) 
Light manufacturing 
 
-205,669 
(16.3%) 
-208,146 
(25.1%) 
-344,002 
(18.6%) 
-514,838 
(23.7%) 
-75,315 
(11.5%) 
-21,574 
(53.1%) 
-1,369,544 
(20.1%) 
High tech 
manufacturing 
-358,618 
(28.4%) 
-235,059 
(28.3%) 
-429,749 
(23.2%) 
-520,908 
(24.0%) 
-78,246 
(11.9%) 
 -1,622,580 
(23.8%) 
Utilities 
 
-52,850 
(4.2%) 
-32,128 
(3.9%) 
-66,685 
(3.6%) 
-64,471 
(3.0%) 
-30,795 
(4.7%) 
-530 
(1.3%) 
-247,459 
(3.6%) 
Construction 
 
   -63,292 
(2.9%) 
  -63,292 
(0.9%) 
Transport and 
logistics 
-296,847 
(23.5%) 
-6,608 
(0.8%) 
-27,239 
(1.5%) 
-161,892 
(7.5%) 
-15,832 
(2.4%) 
-982 
(2.4%) 
-509,400 
(7.5%) 
Retail and personal 
services 
-4,827 
(0.4%) 
     -4,827 
(0.1%) 
Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services 
-36,978 
(2.9%) 
 -9,123 
(0.5%) 
-22,305 
(1.0%) 
-9,552 
(1.5%) 
-3,285 
(8.1%) 
-81,243 
(1.2%) 
Public services 
 
-133,924 
(10.6%) 
-84,856 
(10.2%) 
-114,320 
(6.2%) 
-32,893 
(1.5%) 
-49,334 
(7.5%) 
 -415,327 
(6.1%) 
Performance types        
GVA below average, 
Prod below average. 
-212,177 
(16.8%) 
-102,143 
(12.3%) 
-137,965 
(7.5%) 
-164,340 
(7.6%) 
-65,962 
(10.1%) 
 -682,587 
(10.0%) 
GVA below average, 
Prod above average 
-783,682 
(62.2%) 
-685,773 
(82.6%) 
-1,557,262 
(84.2%) 
-1,865,149 
(85.9%) 
-547,333 
(83.6%) 
-33,855 
(83.4%) 
-5,473,054 
(80.4%) 
GVA above average, 
Prod below average 
-948 
(0.1%) 
 -378 
(0.0%) 
   -1,326 
(0.0%) 
GVA above average, 
Prod above average 
-264,092 
(20.9%) 
-42,169 
(5.1%) 
-154,092 
(8.3%) 
-141,050 
(6.5%) 
-41,603 
(6.4%) 
-6,761 
(16.6%) 
-649,767 
(9.5%) 
Total negative 
employment change 
-1,260,899 
(100.0%) 
-830,085 
(100.0%) 
-1,849,697 
(100.0%) 
-2,170,539 
(100.0%) 
-654,898 
(100.0%) 
-40,616 
(100.0%) 
-6,806,734 
(100.0%) 
Employment in 1971 
 
4,536,668 3,892,775 6,660,088 6,653,791 3,746,650 156,233 25,646,205 
Negative empl.-
change as % of 
employment in 1971 
-27.8% -21.3% -27.8% -32.6% -17.5% -26.0% -26.5% 
 
 
 
32 
Table 8: Breakdown of positive employment change, by broad sector groups and 
performance types for groups of cities; 1971-2014. 
 London Group I: 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Group II: 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Group III: 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
Aberdeen Great 
Britain 
Broad sector groups        
Agriculture and 
fishing 
1,542 
(0.1%) 
2,225 
(0.1%) 
9,974 
(0.3%) 
3,533 
(0.2%) 
26,307 
(1.1%) 
 43,581 
(0.3%) 
Coal and Other 
mining 
     243 
(0.1%) 
243 
(0.0%) 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
 1,412 
(0.0%) 
   30,822 
(18.2%) 
32,234 
(0.2%) 
Metals and related 
 
  1,874 
(0.1%) 
646 
(0.0%) 
1,988 
(0.1%) 
2,348 
(1.4%) 
6,856 
(0.1%) 
Textiles and related 
 
       
Light manufacturing 
 
840 
(1.0%) 
    1,745 
(1.0%) 
2,585 
(0.0%) 
High tech 
manufacturing 
    596 
(0.0%) 
3,493 
(2.1%) 
4,089 
(0.0%) 
Utilities 
 
14,993 
(0.7%) 
25,952 
(0.8%) 
29,582 
(0.8%) 
26,763 
(1.2%) 
21,819 
(0.9%) 
599 
(0.4%) 
119,708 
(0.9%) 
Construction 
 
4,014 
(0.2%) 
132,563 
(3.9%) 
109,510 
(3.1%) 
 100,235 
(4.2%) 
3,129 
(1.9%) 
349,451 
(2.6%) 
Transport and 
logistics 
9,459 
(0.5%) 
269,001 
(8.0%) 
163,857 
(4.6%) 
56,397 
(2.6%) 
120,105 
(5.1%) 
7,807 
(4.6%) 
626,626 
(4.6%) 
Retail and personal 
services 
463,845 
(22.4%) 
907,323 
(27.0%) 
905,220 
(25.5%) 
517,827 
(24.1%) 
691,876 
(29.3%) 
37,324 
(22.1%) 
3,523,415 
(25.8%) 
Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services 
1,175,802 
(56.7%) 
1,192,231 
(35.4%) 
1,257,638 
(35.5%) 
660,621 
(30.7%) 
589,942 
(25.0%) 
50,374 
(29.8%) 
4,926,608 
(36.0%) 
Public services 
 
402,386 
(19.4%) 
835,846 
(24.8%) 
1,068,706 
(30.1%) 
884,087 
(41.1%) 
809,794 
(34.3%) 
31,070 
(18.4%) 
4,031,889 
(29.5%) 
Performance types        
GVA below average, 
Prod below average. 
368,785 
(17.8%) 
860,358 
(25.6%) 
821,478 
(23.2%) 
432,754 
(20.1%) 
640,595 
(27.1%) 
27,844 
(16.5%) 
3,151,814 
(23.1%) 
GVA below average, 
Prod above average 
1,108 
(0.1%) 
7,800 
(0.2%) 
  15,749 
(0.7%) 
7,576 
(4.5%) 
32,233 
(0.2%) 
GVA above average, 
Prod below average 
1,280,866 
(61.8%) 
1,734,371 
(51.5%) 
2,147,743 
(60.6%) 
1,480,757 
(68.9%) 
1,300,643 
(55.0%) 
67,960 
(40.2%) 
8,012,340 
(58.6%) 
GVA above average, 
Prod above average 
422,122 
(20.4%) 
764,024 
(22.7%) 
577,140 
(16.3%) 
236,363 
(11.0%) 
405,675 
(17.2%) 
65,574 
(38.8%) 
2,470,898 
(18.1%) 
Total positive 
employment change 
2,072,881 
(100.0%) 
3,366,553 
(100.0%) 
3,546,361 
(100.0%) 
2,149,874 
(100.0%) 
2,362,662 
(100.0%) 
168,954 
(100.0%) 
13,667,285 
(100.0%) 
Employment in 1971 
 
4,536,668 3,892,775 6,660,088 6,653,791 3,746,650 156,233 25,646,205 
Positive empl.-
change as % of 
employment in 1971 
45.7% 86.5% 53.2% 32.3% 63.1% 108.1% 53.3% 
 
 
The uneven effects of the process of structural transformation also need to be highlighted. 
The decline in employment due to job losses in various sectors (especially in manufacturing) 
seems to have been particularly large in Group III, London and Group II. But then London 
and Group II (and furthermore the non-urban TTWAs) seemed to have gained a lot of new 
employment in other sectors (mainly services), following the national pattern in this respect. 
Employment in Group I clearly grew a much faster than the average. Group III however has, 
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by 2014, not even fully recovered from the losses of employment it sustained already in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 
The focus on employment moreover further highlights differences in productivity across 
sectors, and also across cities. Those sectors that have exhibited relatively favourable 
output and productivity growth, compared to the nation, mainly most of the KIBS, are of 
particular interest. About 40% of the growth in output in Great Britain over the period from 
1971 until 2014 has come from these sectors, yet they have contributed less than 20% of 
the growth in employment. By far the most employment growth has been in sectors which 
have indeed also grown relatively fast in output, but in which the increase of output per 
job—labour productivity—has been below average (such as personal services, health and 
social care, and warehousing). The remaining source of employment growth has been in 
sectors that have experienced low output growth and consequently also low-productivity 
growth (such as education, construction, and accommodation and leisure). 
 
Moreover, the geographical distribution of the growth of high-value-added employment 
across the cities is again quite uneven, being concentrated in Group I and London. In 
contrast, they have only constituted a small part of employment growth of the cities in 
Group III, in which employment gains have instead consisted disproportionally of jobs in 
sectors that have experienced below average growth in productivity. Thus, structural 
transformation in the British economy also seems reflected in divergent growth of 
productivity across cities, and thus ultimately real incomes. The divergent development of 
productivity across British cities—a critical issue attracting increasing attention from the UK 
Government in relation to its new Industrial Strategy (HM Government, 2017)—is examined 
in Martin et al. (2017). 
 
 
Conclusions 
Structural change is an ongoing process in dynamic economies. What the foregoing analysis 
demonstrates is that the profound structural transformations in the British e conomy since 
the beginning of the 1970s have played out quite differently across the country’s various 
cities, shaping to a significant extent their divergent growth trajectories. Moreover, the 
relative importance of structural change compared to other determinants of growth has 
varied across different types of city. 
 
The cities in Group I (mainly cities in the South of England)—and London—have benefitted 
substantially from structural transformation and have seen strong growth on the back of 
high-growth sectors, especially KIBS. In contrast, the cities in Group III (mainly cities in the 
North of England, Wales and Scotland) have seen decline or little growth in the traditional 
mainstays of their economy (mainly in manufacturing) and, at the same time, have been 
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insufficiently able to grow and attract high-value private service activities. A third group of 
cities—Group II (those that have grown at more or less the national rate)—also have had to 
cope with the negative effects of structural change (though on average not quite to the 
same extent), but fared much better, and managed to make a relatively successful transition 
to a post-industrial economy, albeit with deep new patterns of inequality and labour market 
divisions. Non-urban TTWAs have on the whole had to face less of the negative impacts of 
change in the economic structure; moreover, they actually seem to have profited to some 
extent from some manufacturing moving out of cities. Furthermore, the growth in private 
and public services in such areas has in general been on a par with the average for the 
nation. 
 
However, structural factors cannot in themselves account for the strong growth of cities in 
Group I, and many cities in Group II (and the non-urban TTWAs) also managed to deal with 
structural transformation better than Group III. Moreover, these factors are also insufficient 
to explain the very lacklustre performance of London until the turn of the century, with a 
sudden turn-around in its fortunes thereafter, as well as the full extent of the lagging 
growth in Group III cities. 
 
These results imply that the economic trajectories of cities are the complex and uneven 
outcomes of three fundamental sets of processes, all of which are interactive and 
potentially shaped by their policy and institutional contexts. The first are those structural 
changes in output and employment shares, which we have analysed here in depth. They 
centre on what we might term between-sector changes and refer to the rise of some 
industries and the decline of others. Our analysis has demonstrated the importance of these 
processes in some cities and has allowed us to understand the extent to which post-
industrial transition produces growth-reducing structural change in some categories of city. 
 
A second set of processes concerns within-sector changes and includes the way in which 
different parts of the same industry change and evolve over time. They highlight the way in 
which different firms within the same industry may have different productivity and 
innovation capabilities and track records. Cities host firms that are classified as belonging to 
the same industry but are actually quite different in their capabilities, employment, business 
models and strategies; and these ‘within-sector’ effects will also contribute to divergent 
economic performances. Our findings on the importance of ‘local effects’ in some types of 
cities may well indicate in part that these ‘within-sector’ effects also have a significant and 
growing spatial dimension. There are certainly many theoretical arguments that support and 
envisage this, as they suggest that globalisation and new supply chains and divisions of 
labour are widening differences between firms within industries and creating new types of 
specialisations in terms of functions, tasks and capabilities rather than entire sectors 
(Baldwin, 2016; Massey, 1995). Different rates of entrepreneurship and firm demographics, 
as well as investment and foreign ownership, may also be reinforcing these spatial 
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variations. We have not been able to investigate these within-sector effects in this article, 
but this is certainly an important area for future research (see Martin et al., 2017). 
 
However, a third set of processes centring on the development of cities’ local supply factors 
is also interacting through time with both of these two types of industrial change. We know 
that there are important differences in the capabilities of cities to offer firms an attractive 
business environment through the supply of both appropriate ‘hard and soft’ infrastructure 
and the development of a local labour force sought by knowledge-intensive and tradeable 
industries. As we have argued elsewhere (Martin et al., 2016b), local areas start with an 
inherited pattern of land use, a resource base and institutions that were tailored to another 
era, and the legacy of the past weighs heavily on their ability to adjust to new economic 
futures. Thus, the Group III cities tend to be among the oldest industrial cities with 
infrastructure, labour forces and a constrained land use pattern to match (see Fothergill and 
Gudgin, 1982). In contrast, our fast-growing Group I cities contain post-Second World War 
New Towns characterised by plentiful and planned land assembly, up-to-date infrastructure 
and labour with skills more appropriate to the new age. While there is considerable scope 
for policy initiatives to modify and improve these local supply factors and characteristics, it 
is also the case that their development is primarily the outcome of a long-term cumulative 
and path-dependent process in which industrial change plays a key role and accumulates 
different types of assets and institutions (Storper et al., 2015). 
 
In the course of the dynamic specialisation seen in city economies, the relationships 
between these three sets of processes are deeply recursive through time. Moreover, while 
beyond the scope of this article, in order to properly understand the direction and degree of 
‘within and between sector’ effects in a particular urban area, we need to understand how 
city economies sit within regional ensembles of industries as well as within national and 
global markets and supply chain relationships (McCann, 2016). 
 
What this suggests is that unambiguously determining the effects of structural change for 
urban economic performance is much more complex and difficult than might be assumed. 
While our dynamic shift-share analysis has allowed us to rigorously distinguish and pull out 
the direct effects of structural change on variations in city growth, it is not intended to 
identify more indirect and evolutionary path-dependent effects that stem from structural 
change. But these indirect effects may be important and may be closely integrated with 
both within-sector and local supply-side development in specific ensembles. More 
specifically, studies of deindustrialisation in particular cities have increasingly emphasised 
that it is a long-term process that has lasting, damaging and continuing effects on 
communities and economies (Martin and Gardiner, 2017). Indeed, sociologists have 
described ‘the half-life of deindustrialisation’ to capture these lasting inhibiting influences 
effects on cultures and individuals (see Linkon, 2013; Strangleman, 2017). 
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In economic terms, our evidence suggests that such effects have been particularly strong in 
Group III cities, and it may be significant that cities in this group appear to have a stronger 
concentration of metals and related industries. Further investigation might find that the 
lasting effects of deindustrialisation may be strongest in such cities, where industrial plant 
and premises are hardest to convert, where land is often contaminated and where negative 
images of industrial decline are most often entrenched. Interestingly, Group II cities seem to 
have had greater concentrations in textiles, which may have experienced less severe 
obstacles to conversion and renewal. But without further research, we can at this stage only 
speculate about the causes of the differences between the two groups of cities in 
responding to negative structural change. It may be that varied legacies of decline have 
shaped within-sector effects in service industries. It could also be that the two groups are 
distinguished more by their policy environments and character of their collective and 
institutional agency. Nevertheless, the broader point is that structural change and 
deindustrialisation are a key source of lasting path-dependent effects in some cities (Martin 
and Sunley, 2006). 
 
While it is important not to paint too deterministic and bleak a picture, as deindustrialised 
economies undoubtedly contain many resources and assets for renewal, our interpretation 
is that the legacies of these economies have frequently constrained and filtered the 
development of growth of service sector firms, as well as the provision of a skilled and 
educated labour force that is well suited to knowledge-intensive firm growth. There may 
well be a type of spatial differentiation and sorting in which the emergence and growth of 
knowledge-intensive and high-productivity firms is shaped by the degree to which path 
dependence allows some cities to be more valued by these firms and their employees. Our 
decomposition techniques are not suited to fully capturing these long-term legacies and 
indirect effects, as they will show up only as local competitiveness effects and residuals. 
They require much fuller and more detailed intensive investigation than we have been able 
to offer in this extensive and synthetic article. Nevertheless, we hope to have highlighted 
their potential importance in conjunction with measurable structural industrial change. 
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Annex 1. Data Construction 
 
Definition 
The definition of cities used in the paper is based on the concept of the Travel To Work Area (TTWA) 
which is defined by the ONS3 as a self-contained labour market area where ‘at least 75% of the 
area's resident workforce work in the area and at least 75% of the people who work in the area also 
live in the area. The area must also have an economically active population of at least 3,500.’ The 
TTWAs are revised every 10 years in line with new information from the census on commuting 
patterns, with the most recent list dating from 2011 where 228 TTWAs were identified4. 
Developing a time series sectoral TTWA-city database 
While the functional definition of the TTWA is well-founded, a drawback to its use is that the data 
are typically only available for the year of definition, making analysis over time impossible. To 
circumvent this problem, Cambridge Econometrics (CE) made use of its own Local Authority District 
(LAD) database which is based on 45 sectors for GVA and employment, as well as total and working-
age population, over the period 1981-2014, and matched this to the TTWA boundaries. In addition, it 
both extended the time period of the data back to 1971, and increased the sector definition for GVA 
and employment to 82 sectors. Table A1 below provides a description and definition of the 45 and 
82 sector disaggregations and their SIC codes.  
 
TableA 1:  45-sector and 82-sector disaggregation 
45 Sectors 82 Sectors SIC 2007 codes 
(82 Sector) 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
Crop and animal production, hunting and 
related service activities 1 
 Forestry and logging 2 
 Fishing and aquaculture 3 
Mining & quarrying Mining of coal and lignite 5 
 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6 
 Mining of metal ores 7 
 Other mining and quarrying 8 
 Mining support service activities 9 
Food, drink & tobacco Manufacture of food products 10 
 Manufacture of beverages 11 
 Manufacture of tobacco products 12 
Textiles etc Manufacture of textiles 13 
 Manufacture of wearing apparel 14 
                                                          
 
3See 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/article
s/traveltoworkareaanalysisingreatbritain/2016 for more information. 
4 See http://ons.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=397ccae5d5c7472e87cf0ca766386cc2 
for an interactive map of the TTWA boundaries. 
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45 Sectors 82 Sectors SIC 2007 codes 
(82 Sector) 
 Manufacture of leather and related products 15 
Wood & paper 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood 
and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 16 
 Manufacture of paper and paper products 17 
Printing & recording Printing and reproduction of recorded media 18 
Coke & petroleum 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products 19 
Chemicals 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 20 
Pharmaceuticals 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations 21 
Non-metallic mineral products Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 22 
 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 23 
Metals & metal products Manufacture of basic metals 24 
 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment 25 
Electronics 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and 
optical products 26 
Electrical equipment Manufacture of electrical equipment 27 
Machinery 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. 28 
Motor vehicles 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 29 
Other transport equipment Manufacture of other transport equipment 30 
Other manufacturing & repair Manufacture of furniture 31 
 
Other manufacturing; Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 32, 33 
Electricity & gas 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 35 
Water, sewerage & waste Water collection, treatment and supply 36 
 Sewerage 37 
 
Waste collection, treatment and disposal 
activities; materials recovery 38 
 
Remediation activities and other waste 
management services. This division includes 
the provision of remediation services, i.e. the 
cleanup of contaminated buildings and sites, 
soil, surface or ground water. 39 
Construction 
Construction of buildings, Civil engineering, 
Specialised construction activities 41,42,43 
Motor vehicles trade 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 45 
Wholesale trade 
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 46 
Retail trade 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 47 
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45 Sectors 82 Sectors SIC 2007 codes 
(82 Sector) 
Land transport Land transport and transport via pipelines 49 
Water transport Water transport 50 
Air transport Air transport 51 
Warehousing & postal 
Warehousing and support activities for 
transportation 52 
 Postal and courier activities 53 
Accommodation Accommodation 55 
Food & beverage services Food and beverage service activities 56 
Media Publishing activities 58 
 
Motion picture, video and television 
programme production, sound recording and 
music publishing activities 59 
 Programming and broadcasting activities 60 
 Telecommunications 61 
IT services 
Computer programming, consultancy and 
related activities 62 
 Information service activities 63 
Financial & insurance 
Financial service activities, except insurance 
and pension funding 64 
 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, 
except compulsory social security 65 
 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and 
insurance activities 66 
Real estate Real estate activities 68 
Legal & accounting Legal and accounting activities 69 
Head offices & management 
consultancies 
Activities of head offices; management 
consultancy activities 70 
Architectural & engineering 
services 
Architectural and engineering activities; 
technical testing and analysis 71 
 Scientific research and development 72 
Other professional services Advertising and market research 73 
 
Other professional, scientific and technical 
activities 74 
 Veterinary activities 75 
Business support services Rental and leasing activities 77 
 Employment activities 78 
 
Travel agency, tour operator and other 
reservation service and related activities 79 
 Security and investigation activities 80 
 Services to buildings and landscape activities 81 
 
Office administrative, office support and other 
business support activities 82 
Public Administration & 
Defence 
Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 84 
Education Education 85 
Health Human health activities 86 
Residential & social Residential care activities 87 
 Social work activities without accommodation 88 
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45 Sectors 82 Sectors SIC 2007 codes 
(82 Sector) 
Arts Creative, arts and entertainment activities 90 
Recreational services 
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural 
activities 91 
 Gambling and betting activities 92 
 
Sports activities and amusement and 
recreation activities 93 
 Activities of membership organisations 94 
Other services 
Repair of computers and personal and 
household goods 95 
 Other personal service activities 96 
 
 
An explanation is provided below of each of these stages involved. 
(i) Cambridge Econometrics LAD database (1981-2014, 45 sectors) 
CE maintains a disaggregated database of employment5 and (constant price) GVA data by industry 
(45 detailed sectors) from 1981 for all unitary authorities and local authority districts in Great 
Britain.  
This database is formed from a UK-level 86-sector database, which is based on raw data from the 
ONS and CE’s own estimates. Regional (NUTS1) data are constructed at the 45 sector level, which are 
scaled and made consistent with the UK sectoral data. These data (back to 1992 for employees and 
1996 for self-employed) are based on the quarterly workforce jobs data from the ONS as the main 
dataset which provides data by 19 industries by region, type (full-time, part-time and self-employed) 
and gender. To move from the 19 industries to 45 sectors, data from the Business Registry and 
Employment Survey (BRES) and Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), based on SIC07, were used to 
generate industry shares by each region 
The GVA data are consistent with sectoral data at NUTS 2 level from the ONS Regional Accounts. 
(ii) Extending the time period back to 1971 
To extrapolate the dataset back to 1971, the growth rates of CE’s existing historical dataset are used, 
which are themselves based on older ONS data from the Census of Employment and ABI. These 
older datasets were converted to the latest standard industrial classification (SIC07) to maintain 
consistency with the more recent data. Historical boundary changes for regions and local authorities 
were also adjusted for, as part of this process to ensure consistency. 
(iii) Increasing disaggregation to 82 sectors 
At local area level, employment data are the most readily available from the ONS (through NOMIS6), 
and these data were the first to be collected and processed. The latest available data (BRES data 
                                                          
 
5 The measure of employment is workplace based jobs, which include full-time, part-time and self-employed. 
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based on SIC 2007) were obtained, with older vintages of data (from BRES7, ABI and the Census of 
Employment8) being used to construct consistent historical growth rates which were then applied to 
the latest levels to give a consistent back series for each sector and local authority district. Table A2 
below provides a summary of sources. 
Table A2:  Datasets used for detailed sector dissaggregation 
Dataset Time period Sectors 
BRES 2009-2014 86 (effectively 82*)9 
BRES 2008-2009 86 (effectively 82*) 
Annual Business Inquiry - Employee Analysis 1998-2008 60 (split to 82) 
Annual Business Employment -Survey Employee 
Analysis 
1991-1998 60 (split to 82) 
Census of employment – Employee Analysis 1975-1981 183 (aggregated to 82) 
Census of employment – Employee Analysis 1971-1974 183 (aggregated to 82) 
 
 
The GVA data were then constructed by applying NUTS2-level productivity data (as provided by the 
ONS) to the employment data. This required the mapping of NUTS2 regions to districts and the 
mapping of the detailed sectors to the fewer sectors for which sub-national productivity data is 
available from the ONS. 
Finally, LAD-level population data were collected from the ONS mid-year population estimates and 
presented alongside the employment and GVA data. 
(iv) Fitting the LAD database to TTWA definitions 
With the LAD database complete, the final process was to match the areas to the TTWA definitions. 
There was no easy way to do this – because both LADs and TTWAs are non-overlapping geographies 
all allocations were required to add up. The process was largely a trial and error one, matching the 
boundaries, looking at large urban agglomerations and judging the proportions of which LAD should 
go in which TTWA – some were easy, others less so. An error margin of +/-5% was used to judge 
whether the combined proportions of LAD populations was sufficiently close to the TTWA 
population and density in 2011. As the focus of the work was on larger urban areas, the matching 
process was concentrated mostly on those areas that would subsequently be used for more detailed 
analysis – the logic behind this selection is described below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
6 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/  
7 BRES is an ONS business survey which (from 2010 onwards) replaced the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). 
8 Also obtained from NOMIS. 
9 The 86 sectors mentioned in the table did not map well to the 45 sectors. As a result, the number of sectors 
were aggregated to map 82 sectors to the 45. 
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Choosing which cities to analyse 
The full set of 228 TTWAs was considered too many for city-based analysis, particularly as many of 
them are quite small and/or do not contain urban centres of any significance. Analysis took place to 
determine a suitable cut-off point based on population size and density of the TTWAs in 2014, and 
on this basis the top 85 TTWAs 10were selected. Combined, the selected TTWAs used in the paper 
account for 82% of GB population, 83% of employment and 86% of output in 2014. 
  
                                                          
 
10 TTWAs in Northern Ireland were not considered because the CE LAD database does not cover this region, 
and so the process of data extension and matching was not possible. 
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Annex 2. Definition of City Groups and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table A3: Scenario 0: Groups of British cities defined according to half standard deviation 
around weighted national average (0.00%) of cumulative differential 
performance over 1971-2014 
Group I 
(27 cities) 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Peterborough, Chichester, Tunbridge Wells, 
Mansfield, Reading, Guildford, High Wycombe & Aylesbury, Derby, 
Crewe, Norwich, Chesterfield, Bournemouth, Exeter, Cambridge, Slough 
& Heathrow, Lincoln, York, Southampton, Eastbourne, Ipswich 
Group II 
(33 cities) 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Trowbridge, Dunfermline & Kirkcaldy, Wakefield, Shrewsbury, Halifax, 
Blyth & Ashington, Colchester, Kettering & Wellingborough, Oxford, 
Stevenage, Gloucester, Doncaster, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, 
Chelmsford, Falkirk & Stirling, Luton, Leicester, Worcester & 
Kidderminster, Chester, Southend, Sunderland, Barnsley, Warrington & 
Wigan, Huddersfield, Brighton, Edinburgh, Bedford, Preston, Durham & 
Bishop Auckland, Bradford, Manchester 
Group III 
(23 cities) 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Portsmouth, Coventry, Cardiff, Hull, Newport, Medway, Merthyr Tydfil, 
Motherwell & Airdrie, Middlesbrough & Stockton, Sheffield, Blackburn, 
Plymouth, Newcastle, Birmingham, Dudley, Birkenhead, Blackpool, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, Swansea, Glasgow, Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities 
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Table A4: Scenario 1: Groups of British cities defined according to half standard deviation 
around national rate (2.15%) of compound growth rate over 1971-2014 
Group I 
(23 cities) 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Tunbridge Wells, Peterborough, Chichester, 
Reading, Guildford, High Wycombe & Aylesbury, Derby, Mansfield, 
Crewe, Norwich, Bournemouth, Exeter, Slough & Heathrow, Cambridge, 
Lincoln, Southampton 
Group II 
(34 cities) 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Ipswich, Eastbourne, Trowbridge, Chesterfield, York, Shrewsbury, 
Halifax, Blyth & Ashington, Colchester, Dunfermline & Kirkcaldy, 
Stevenage, Wakefield, Leeds, Gloucester, Oxford 
Kettering & Wellingborough, Bristol, Chelmsford, Nottingham, Luton, 
Falkirk and Stirling, Leicester, Barnsley, Warrington & Wigan, Worcester 
& Kidderminster, Southend, Chester, Doncaster, Huddersfield, 
Sunderland, Brighton, Edinburgh, Bedford, Bradford 
Group III 
(26 cities) 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Preston, Manchester, Durham & Bishop Auckland, Cardiff, Portsmouth, 
Coventry, Hull, Medway, Newport, Merthyr Tydfil, Motherwell & Airdrie, 
Plymouth, Sheffield, Newcastle, Blackburn, Birmingham, Middlesbrough 
& Stockton, Dudley, Birkenhead, Blackpool, Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, 
Swansea, Glasgow, Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities 
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Table A5: Scenario 2: Groups of British cities defined according to full standard deviation 
around weighted national average (0.00%) of cumulative differential 
performance over 1971-2014 
Group I 
(13 cities) 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Peterborough, Chichester, Tunbridge Wells, 
Mansfield, Reading, Guildford 
Group II 
(62 cities) 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
High Wycombe & Aylesbury, Derby, Crewe, Norwich, Chesterfield, 
Bournemouth, Exeter, Cambridge, Slough & Heathrow, Lincoln, York, 
Southampton, Eastbourne, Ipswich, Trowbridge, Dunfermline & 
Kirkcaldy, Wakefield, Shrewsbury, Halifax, Blyth & Ashington, 
Colchester, Kettering & Wellingborough, Oxford, Stevenage, Gloucester, 
Doncaster, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, Chelmsford, Falkirk & Stirling, 
Luton, Leicester, Worcester & Kidderminster, Chester, Southend, 
Sunderland, Barnsley, Warrington & Wigan, Huddersfield, Brighton, 
Edinburgh, Bedford, Preston, Durham & Bishop Auckland, Bradford, 
Manchester, Portsmouth, Coventry, Cardiff, Hull, Newport, Medway, 
Merthyr Tydfil, Motherwell & Airdrie, Middlesbrough & Stockton, 
Sheffield, Blackburn, Plymouth, Newcastle, Birmingham, Dudley 
Group III 
(8 cities) 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Birkenhead, Blackpool, Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, Swansea, Glasgow, 
Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities 
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Table A6: Scenario 3A: Groups of British cities defined according to half standard 
deviation around weighted national average (0.00%) of cumulative differential 
performance over 1971-2014, with smaller Group I (-5 cities) and larger Group 
III (+5 cities) 
Group I 
(22 cities) 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Peterborough, Chichester, Tunbridge Wells, 
Mansfield, Reading, Guildford, High Wycombe & Aylesbury, Derby, 
Crewe, Norwich, Chesterfield, Bournemouth, Exeter, Cambridge, Slough 
& Heathrow 
Group II 
(33 cities) 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Lincoln, York, Southampton, Eastbourne, Ipswich, Trowbridge, 
Dunfermline & Kirkcaldy, Wakefield, Shrewsbury, Halifax, Blyth & 
Ashington, Colchester, Kettering & Wellingborough, Oxford, Stevenage, 
Gloucester, Doncaster, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, Chelmsford, Falkirk & 
Stirling, Luton, Leicester, Worcester & Kidderminster, Chester, 
Southend, Sunderland, Barnsley, Warrington & Wigan, Huddersfield, 
Brighton, Edinburgh 
Group III 
(28 cities) 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Bedford, Preston, Durham & Bishop Auckland, Bradford, Manchester, 
Portsmouth, Coventry, Cardiff, Hull, Newport, Medway, Merthyr Tydfil, 
Motherwell & Airdrie, Middlesbrough & Stockton, Sheffield, Blackburn, 
Plymouth, Newcastle, Birmingham, Dudley, Birkenhead, Blackpool, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, Swansea, Glasgow, Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities 
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Table A7: Scenario 3B: Groups of British cities defined according to half standard 
deviation around weighted national average (0.00%) of cumulative differential 
performance over 1971-2014, with larger Group I (+5 cities) and smaller Group 
III (-5 cities). 
Group I 
(32 cities) 
‘pulling 
ahead’ 
Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Peterborough, Chichester, Tunbridge Wells, 
Mansfield, Reading, Guildford, High Wycombe & Aylesbury, Derby, 
Crewe, Norwich, Chesterfield, Bournemouth, Exeter, Cambridge, Slough 
& Heathrow, Lincoln, York, Southampton, Eastbourne, Ipswich, 
Trowbridge, Dunfermline & Kirkcaldy, Wakefield, Shrewsbury, Halifax 
Group II 
(33 cities) 
‘keeping 
pace’ 
Blyth & Ashington, Colchester, Kettering & Wellingborough, Oxford, 
Stevenage, Gloucester, Doncaster, Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, 
Chelmsford, Falkirk & Stirling, Luton, Leicester, Worcester & 
Kidderminster, Chester, Southend, Sunderland, Barnsley, Warrington & 
Wigan, Huddersfield, Brighton, Edinburgh, Bedford, Preston, Durham & 
Bishop Auckland, Bradford, Manchester, Portsmouth, Coventry, Cardiff, 
Hull, Newport 
Group III 
(18 cities) 
‘falling 
behind’ 
Medway, Merthyr Tydfil, Motherwell & Airdrie, Middlesbrough & 
Stockton, Sheffield, Blackburn, Plymouth, Newcastle, Birmingham, 
Dudley, Birkenhead, Blackpool, Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, Swansea, 
Glasgow, Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities 
 
 
Figure A1.  The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential 
output growth relative to GB growth across the City Groups, in GVA (billion £s, 
2011 CMV) based on 82 sectors; Scenario 0 
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Figure A2.  The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential 
output growth relative to GB growth across the City Groups, in GVA (billion £s, 
2011 CMV) based on 82 sectors; Scenario 1 
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Figure A3.  The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential 
output growth relative to GB growth across the City Groups, in GVA (billion £s, 
2011 CMV) based on 82 sectors; Scenario 2 
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Figure A4.  The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential 
output growth relative to GB growth across the City Groups, in GVA (billion £s, 
2011 CMV) based on 82 sectors; Scenario 3A 
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Figure A5.  The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential 
output growth relative to GB growth across the City Groups, in GVA (billion £s, 
2011 CMV) based on 82 sectors; Scenario 3B 
Group I  
 
 
 
57 
Group II  
 
Group III 
 
